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TWO AREAS OF LABOR LAW TO BE REASSESSED:




There are two areas of labor relations law, the duty of fair representation
and the National Labor Relations Board's remedial policies, which, in my
judgment, are about to undergo that process lawyers are fond of calling
"elucidating litigation." These two areas may very likely have a significant
impact on that NLRB's caseload which, since 1970, has increased by eighty
percent. Of course, a certain caution must accompany a Board Member's
crystal ball gazing - not only a caution which seeks to avoid even the appearance
of prejudgment, but a caution which recognizes that judgment itself must be
susceptible to continuing reevaluation. With this perspective in mind, I will
discuss each of these areas in turn.
BREACH OF THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION:
UNION DISCRIMINATION
Union discrimination against members or prospective members of its
bargaining unit is an aspect of the doctrine of the duty of fair representation.
The basic principle of this doctrine, enunciated in Vaca v. Sipes, I is that a
union breaches its duty of fair representation, "only when [its] conduct toward
a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in
bad faith." Even though every unit member that is unhappy with a union's
conduct sees his or her gripe as fitting within that standard, what must be
remembered in fair representation cases, in my judgment, is that the critical
inquiry is unrelated to the specific union action under attack. The issue, under
the Vaca standard, is not whether the union should have acted differently but,
instead, whether the decision not to act differently was reached in good faith.
There probably will not be much movement in the years ahead to elaborate
upon the Vaca standard. The duty of fair representation involves an effort to
determine what rights are, or should be, retained by individuals who either
have chosen to unionize or, short of that, are subject to unionization by virtue
of majority rule principles. Strict guidelines governing that kind of inquiry
should not be expected; more importantly, strict guidelines might well upset
the equality of bargaining power that is fundamental to the statutory scheme
of things.
*Chairman, National Labor Relations Board. A.B., Providence College; LL.B. Catholic University School
of Law.
I. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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What can be expected is final resolution of two particular questions which
arise out of the doctrine: first, whether the Board can properly refrain from
resolving allegations of union racial and sex descrimination in precertification
representation proceedings - my view is that it can - and, second, whether
all breaches of the duty of fair representation can be remedied under the
unfair labor practice provisions of the statute - my position has been that not
all such breaches can.
Refraining from Resolving Precertification Allegations
The duty of fair representation, as its very name implies, derives from a
union's Section 9(a) 2 exclusive representative status. For about half of the life
of the Board, the duty of fair representation was considered exclusively within
Section 9 proceedings and more importantly, exclusively in the context of an
already certified representative. It was not until 1962, in Miranda Fuel, 3 that
the Board concluded that a breach of this duty was remediable under Section
8(b)'s unfair labor practice provisions. 4 Miranda Fuel asserted that because a
union owed employees a duty to represent them fairly, that duty had to be
"read into" the Section 7 right of employees "to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing," and a union's breach of its fair
representation duty therefore constituted the infringement of a Section 7 right
and an unfair labor practice.
In 1964, Hughes Tool H15 added a constitutional gloss to such inquiries.
Hughes was a combined representation and unfair labor practice case. In the
representation case, the Board held that its rescission of the union's certification
was mandated by a constitutional proscription against the Board "render[ing]
aid under Section 9 of the Act to a labor organization which discriminates
racially when acting as a statutory bargaining representative." Former Chairman
McCulloch and I agreed that the certification should be revoked, but considered
it unnecessary and possibly inappropriate to couch the issue in terms of
constitutional limitations on the Board's role under Section 9. The contracts
negotiated by the certified union in Hughes Tool II were patently dis-
criminatory and violated the duty of fair representation under Section 9.
It was a short jump from Hughes Tool II to the so-called 1.ndy Andy
line of cases. LCnallenges to election petitions on the ground thaThIe 'unioi
seeking representation discriminated, either on the basis of race, sex or national
origin against employees, represented two-fold shift away from the Board's
initial approach to unfair representation inquiries. First ..... 1
iengd was n ,e ete. Second, the challenge was hein
employer, as opposed to a[nindividual member ofthe unit or inn*L .Hughes
Tool i7s constitutiona -approach was a logical invitation to such a dramatic
2. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976):
(a) Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining
in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment:
Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any
time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the
intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with
the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That
the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
3. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.R.L.B. 181 (1962), enf denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976).
5. Independent Metal Workers, Local I (Hughes Tool Co.), 147 N.L.R.B. 1536 (1964).
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The Board's initial response to such challenges was to continue to follow
the Hughes Tool II approach. But Bekins Moving & Storage6 which
reaffirmed Hughes Tool I, was short-lived. In Handy Andy 7 and Bell &
Howell 8 a new Board majority adopted the dissenting opinion of Member
Penello in Bekins and held that the Board would investigate allegations of
union discrimination only in post-certification proceedings exclusive of summary
judgment certification-test cases. The conclusion flowed from the view that
certification itself was not only a facially neutral act falling short of the kinds
of governmental action posing potential constitutional problems, but also an
act mandated by statute in those situations where a fair election resulted in
a majority vote for representation. Bell & Howell has been enforced by the
D. C. Circuit Court of Appeals, but the process of elucidating litigation in
this area will continue.
Impact of Future Litigation
The Handy Andy and Bell & Howell litigation may leave its mark on the
second unfair representation question alluded to earlier; whether all breaches
of the duty of fair representation are remediable under the unfair labor practice
provisions of the statute. My basic difficulty with Miranda Fuel and its
"irrelevant, invidious, or unfair" standard has been that it permits too broad
an intrusion into internal union affairs and frequently transforms the Board
into an instrument for policies far broader than those committed by statute
to it. But the Handy Andy cases, while emphasizing the Board's traditional
statutory responsibility-the speedy resolution of questions concerning
representation-also indicated a procedural preference for the resolution of
allegations of discrimination in unfair labor practice proceedings. Those strains
tug Miranda Fuel in different directions. Given the increasing frequency with
which fair representation issues arise at the Board, some movement can be
expected in one direction or the other in the years ahead and that will be an
interesting development to follow.
FUTURE BOARD REMEDIAL POLICIES
It is important to note that when I came to the Board in 1957, 62% of
all charges filed against labor organizations were filed by individuals as opposed
to employers or other labor organizations. Last fiscal year the figure was, over
82%.
There are, no doubt, a variety of factors that account for the fact that
the Board's unfair labor practice caseload increases at a rate between six and
eight percent every year. From one standpoint, an increase in caseload is not
undesirable, for it implies an increasing awareness of the protections the Act
affords. There are, however, less desirable factors at work. The Board receives
far too many discriminatory discharge cases; such cases constitute well over
half of all charges filed against employers. This is made more significant in
light of the fact that charges filed against employers constitute over two thirds
6. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 211 N.L.R.B. 138 (1974).
7. Handy Andy, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 447 (1977).




of all charges filed. There were over 8,000 employer refusal to bargain charges
filed last fiscal year. Most of these charges did not have any merit, but
unfortunately a sizeable number of them did. Section 8(a)(3) 9 and Section
8(a)(5) 10 complaints constituted a percentage of all complaints comparable to
the percentage of charges they represented.
The types of charges filed, the kinds of complaints issued, and the forms
that the Board's remedial actions have taken lend support to the proposition
that the case spiral is at least partly the result of remedial deficiency. The
Board's authority to remedy unfair labor practices, of course, is a broad one,
entitled to great deference by the reviewing courts. 11 This authority is subject
to the one basic limitation that the remedy not be a "patent attempt to achieve
ends other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of
the Act."' 12 Board remedies are just that: remedial. They cannot amount to
punishment of the wrongdoer 13 but, instead, are designed to eliminate the
effects of the unfair labor practice and, to the extent possible, restore the
status quo ante. It has been questioned whether the status quo ante is, in
certain circumstances, enough. The status quo ante of a refusal to bargain is
the obligation to bargain; a remedy for the unlawful refusal cannot compensate
employees for the benefits that might have flowed from collective bargaining
had the bargaining occurred when it should have. It is not fruitful to focus
on perceived remedial infirmities inherent in the statute because that is a
matter outside the Board's control. It is fair to state, however, that the Board
has not exhausted the remedial potential open to it. The authority to remedy
unfair labor practices, typically thought of as emanating from Section
10(C), 14 which requires us to order a violator "to take such affirmative
action . . .as will effectuate the policies of (the) Act," exists alongside the
Board's Section 10(a) 15 authority to "prevent any person from engaging in
any unfair labor practice." Remedies designed to deter violations need not run
afoul of the requirement that our remedies be nonpunitive. The Board's
expanded remedies in recent J. P. Stevens 16 cases are an example of that.
For example, the Board, to remedy the employer's violations of Sections 8(a)(1)
and (3), has ordered the company to give the union access to company bulletin
boards where employee notices are posted and to turn over to the union a list
of employee names and addresses.
In all likelihood, the future will see further exploration in one particular
remedial area: litigation expenses. To some, the cost of undertaking litigation
expenses may be a cheap price to pay for delaying effective bargaining over
an appreciable time.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3): It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer by discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any other term or condition of employment to encourage
or discourage membership in any labor organization.
10. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5): It shall be an unfair labor practice for any employer to bargain collectively
with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.
11. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, n. 32 (1969).
12. Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540 (1943).
13. See Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940).
14. 29 U.S.C. 160(c) (1976).
15. 29 U.S.C. 160(a) (1976).
16. See J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967);
J.P. Stevens & Co., Textile Workers Union v. NLRB, 388 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1968); J.P. Stevens &
Co. v. NLRB, 417 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1970). See also J.P. Stevens & Co. Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 95




The Board has occasionally awarded a charging party reasonable litigation
fees, but, with one exception, all such awards were designed to reimburse the
charging party for legal fees incurred not in connection with the Board's
proceedings, but, rather, in connection with non-Board litigation caused by a
respondent's unlawful activity. For example, in Baptist Memorial Hospital' 7
the Board found that because an employee's arrest and conviction were the
direct result of the employer's unfair labor practice, it was appropriate to
order the respondent to pay the employee's court fine and to reimburse the
employee for attorney's fees incurred in connection with the arrest and conviction.
On the other hand, if the focus is on reimbursement for attorney's fees incurred
in connection with Board litigation, the only case in which such expenses were
awarded other than the J. P. Stevens cases - is the famous Tiidee Products
case. 18 Tiidee itself was the result of a D. C. Circuit Court of Appeals decision
enforcing a refusal to bargain finding but remanding the case to the Board
for further consideration of the extraordinary remedies requested by the charging
party and viewed by the court as justifiable in light of the respondent's "clear
and flagrant" violation of its statutory duty to bargain.
On remand the Board declined to grant most of the extraordinary remedies
requested, but did award the charging party its litigation expenses. The Board's
basic policy in this area is set forth in Heck's Inc. 19 where, in declining to
award the charging party attorney's fees generated by the respondent's refusal
to bargain, the Board alluded to the general American rule that a prevailing
litigant is not ordinarily entitled to its attorney's fees. The Board did note
that the participation of a charging party in Board proceedings can serve
public interests but that whatever protection of such interests might result
from the charging party's litigation was only incidental to its efforts to vindicate
its own personal interests. Tiidee acknowledged that the public interest can
override, however, the general principle barring recovery of attorney's fees by
a prevailing litigant and it can do this when the litigation can fairly be
characterized as "frivolous." Frivolous litigation, the Board said, must be
discouraged in order to effectuate the Act's fundamental aim of maintaining
industrial peace through good-faith collective bargaining. This aim requires
that meritorious cases be given the speediest possible resolution by the Board
and courts. The reimbursement of both the charging party and the Board
included reasonable counsel fees, salaries, witness fees, transcript and record
costs and travel expenses, per diem. In short, it was a truly extraordinary
remedy.
There are substantial policy questions, as well as practical considerations
at work in an expanded application of such remedy. Expanded use of the
remedy can fairly be expected to have some deterrent effect on recalcitrants
who invoke Board processes for any delay that may inhere in them. What
inhibiting effect, if any, will it have on litigation motivated by loftier concerns?
17. Baptist Memorial Hospital, 299 N.L.R.B. 45 (1977). See also United Parcel Service, 203 N.L.R.B.
799 (1973), enfd and remanded, 509 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 421 U.S. 976 (1975),
modified, 220 N.L.R.B. 35 (1975).
18. Tiidee Products, Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 1234 (1977). See also the Board's original decision in Tiidee at
174 N.L.R.B. 705 (1969), enfd and remanded, 426 F.2d 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 950 (1970).
19. 191 N.L.R.B. 886 (1971). This discussion was supplemented to the Heck's Inc. decision at 172
N.L.R.B. 2231 (1968) and the refusal to award attorney fees found in it was upheld by the Supreme
Court. See NLRB v. Food Store Employees Union, Local 347, 417 U.S. 1 (1973). However, the
Board specifically left open the question "whether the Board's broad powers under § 10(c) . . . include
the power to order reimbursement of litigation expenses." See 417 U.S. at n.9.
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While the remedy cannot fairly be characterized as "punitive," is the public
interest underpinning it served only by application of a "frivolous" defense
standard? The Board decisions which contrast "frivolous" defenses with
"debatable" ones20 sometimes make difficult distinctions. If the remedy is to
be employed in the recognition that the public interest is served by weeding
out litigation, sparked solely by the knowledge there is delay in Board
proceedings, should a different standard be employed--one which perhaps
provides clearer guidance but more assuredly acknowledges that litigation
instituted to delay a day of reckoning should be discouraged even though it
might raise, along the way, "debatable" points? By the same token, a more
expansive use of the Tiidee remedy, if it is to be undertaken at all, must be
coupled with relatively clear limitations upon its employment in order to guard
against the possibility that it will be applied more out of a sense of administrative
convenience than with due regard for the industrial system envisioned by the
Act's drafters.
The Act presumes continuing adversarial roles for labor and management.
The fashioning of remedies which have the ancillary effect of dissuading parties
from coming to the agency whose basic mission is to keep those adversaries
within peaceful bounds may be difficult to defend as a truly "remedial" course
of action. The Tiidee remedy is not, obviously, the only area likely to undergo
some reevaluation in the years ahead. Although reimbursement for costs incident
to an organizational campaign can be looked upon, by some, as a loss more
collateral to an unfair labor practice than litigation expenses, there doubtlessly
will be occasions for the Board also to reevaluate its approach in that area.
Current American litigiousness obviously affects the Board and it is a fact
of labor-management life that there are some who are not unhappy about the
level of delay that can accompany Board decisionmaking. There are those who
are not the least bit reticent about adding to it for the sole purpose of
neutralizing statutory principles and guarantees. Remedial policy is a logical
area in which to consider antidotes, and for that reason, Board remedies can
be expected to undergo at least some rethinking in the future.
20. See, e.g., Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1418, 1421 (1976).
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